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Abstract 
The present work is dedicated to the analysis of the nature and impact of EU’s engagement in the 
Caspian region. This territory is divided between two approaches performed by the EU: the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EU Central Asia Strategy for a New Partnership (EUCAS). 
The former has been characterized by a ‘transition paradigm’ inspired by the enlargement toolkit, 
while the EUCAS adopted a ‘pragmatic modernization paradigm’ aimed at supporting Central Asia 
countries in their modernization path.  
The study intends to analyse to what extent the EU’s action proved to have normative 
characteristics when dealing with oil-rich and authoritarian Caspian littoral states. The core 
assumption is that, due to the lack of leverage and influence, the EU’s action has not been purely 
normative, neither under the ENP nor under the EUCAS. The ENP declarations have not been 
followed by a coherent normative engagement, due the contrast between norms and economic 
interests experienced by the EU. In the EUCAS the approach is not normative either, but the 
‘pragmatic modernization paradigm’ led to more interesting results due to the different approach 
deployed, based on neutral forms of cooperation that can lead to enhanced bilateral ties and the pursuit 
of both pragmatic interests and normative objectives.  
Two case studies have been chosen from the two sides of the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan, which 
recently did not sign the Association Agreement under the ENP, and Kazakhstan, a successful 
example of cooperation within the EUCAS. A comparison between the two paradigms is of the utmost 
importance, and the result could offer food for thought in light of the ENP review launched in 2015. 
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Introduction 
Over the years the European Union (EU) has been labelled as a normative power, acting 
internationally through spreading a range of norms and values beyond its borders.1 One of the main 
instruments deployed to promote the EU’s norms is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
which, coherently with the European Security Strategy of December 2003, wants to ensure ‘political 
stability, economic development and close cooperation’2 with Eastern and Southern neighbours. This 
approach is based on guaranteeing political stability through a combined approach favouring regional 
cooperation, as well as democratisation, economic and social development in the countries involved.3 
However, the purposes expressed in the ENP have not always led to a coherent normative 
engagement, due to the fact that in some cases neighbours have not shown interest in conforming to 
the EU’s demands. This resulted in the inconsistency of the EU’s normative approach, especially 
when there were strategic interests in bilateral cooperation with third countries that led the EU to face 
a ‘values vs. interests’ dilemma.4 One of the most striking examples of this trend is the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, a major regional energy player5 included in the ENP and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
framework.6 After a long negotiation process, Azerbaijan did not sign the Association Agreement 
(AA), perceived as an imposition of the EU’s values, declaring the aim to establish an agreement on 
                                                 
I wish to thank my thesis supervisor, Professor Wolfgang Wessels, for his support during the research period. I would 
like to thank Umur Akansel, for his availability and sincere participation to my work. A special thank goes also to all the 
experts that I interviewed. They provided me different elements that have been essential for the final outcome of my 
analysis. In particular, Mr Pierre Borgoltz gave me fundamental insights that made my work possible. 
1 S. Panebianco and R. Rossi, EU attempts to export norms of good governance to the Mediterranean and Western Balkan 
countries, Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, no. 53, April 2004, p. 2, retrieved 21 April 
2016, http://aei.pitt.edu/6109/1/jmwp53.pdf. 
2 D. Mahncke, ‘The Logic of the EU neighbourhood Policy, in D. Mahncke and S. Gstöhl (eds.), Europe’s Near Abroad: 
promises and prospects of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2003, p. 19. 
2 D. Mahncke, op. cit., p. 26. 
3 Ibid., pp. 26-30. 
4 A. Cooley, ‘Principles in the pipeline: managing transatlantic values and interests in Central Asia’, International Affairs, vol. 
84, no. 6, 2008, p. 1187. 
5 ‘Azerbaijan country profile’, BBC, 2015, retrieved 17 April 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17043424. 
6 M. Popescu, ‘Exploring The Limits of The EU’s Normative Power Towards the South Caucasus’, Europolity - Continuity and 
Change in European Governance, vol. 7, no. 1, 2013, p. 59. 
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‘Strategic Modernisation Partnership’7 which would allow both the EU and Baku to pursue more 
strategic interests. 
Together with Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan is one of the 
Caspian Sea littoral states which set the borders of the Caspian region, where Western involvement 
has been very limited over the years. This is one of the elements that led the region to be dominated 
by oil-rich authoritarian regimes the EU has to deal with due to energy and security interests. The 
2004 enlargement further increased the necessity for the EU to play a greater role in its wider 
neighbourhood, and two different strategies were elaborated to deal with countries situated at the two 
banks of the Caspian Sea. In 2004 the South Caucasus was included in the ENP.8 On the opposite 
side of the Sea, the EU launched the European Union Central Asia Strategy for a New Partnership 
(EUCAS) in 2007. The differences between ENP and EUCAS led to an uneven policy approach of 
the EU towards the Caspian Region, which did not take into consideration geographical proximity 
and similarities between South Caucasus and Central Asia. 
This work assesses to what extent the EU has the capacity to be a normative actor in the 
Caspian region, thus measuring the consistency of EU’s norms promotion towards unwilling 
countries where the EU cannot exert strong incentives for compliance. Due to the lack of EU’s 
influence in the two Caspian countries used as case studies, it is possible to argue that the EU’s action 
has not been purely normative, neither under the ENP nor under the EUCAS. However, the difference 
between the ‘transition paradigm’ deployed under the ENP and the ‘pragmatic modernization 
paradigm’ performed towards Central Asia helped the EU to achieve more significant results in the 
latter. 
                                                 
7 F. Mammadov, ‘Azerbaijan's foreign policy – A new paradigm of careful pragmatism’, in F. Chiragov et al. (eds.), The South 
Caucasus: Between integration and fragmentation, SAM and European Policy Centre, 2015, p. 33, retrieved 1 April 2016, 
http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_5598_article_-_farhad_mammadov.pdf. 
8 F. Gaub and N. Popescu, The EU neighbours 1995-2015: shades of grey, EUISS Chaillot Paper, no.136, 2015, p. 6, retrieved 
19 April, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Chaillot_Paper_136_EU_neighbours.pdf. 
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The objective is to carry out a selective analysis of the EU’s action towards the two sides of 
the Caspian Sea in order to deal with authoritarian regimes that are notably reluctant to conform to 
its norms and values. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have been selected as the two case studies. Both 
are post-Soviet countries governed by authoritarian regimes with little vulnerability to the EU’s 
influence and characterised by a large reserve of hydrocarbon resources. However, Azerbaijan has 
been included in the ENP9 and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), while Kazakhstan in the EUCAS.  This 
has been followed by different outcomes in the cooperation with the EU. The Republic of Azerbaijan 
did not sign the Association Agreement (AA) and is considered one of the most unwilling neighbours 
to accept EU norms and values. Kazakhstan is part of the EUCAS since 2007, and after the signature 
of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) with the EU in 201510 is considered 
one of the most successful examples of bilateral cooperation in Central Asia.11 The similarities 
between the two case studies allow to analyse the nature and effects of EU’s external action under 
the two different policy frameworks.  
A consistent analysis of the EU as a normative actor in the Caspian region is absent. Therefore, 
the study will go beyond the geographical scope of the ENP, to analyse how the EU structured its 
relations with Kazakhstan, where the EU deployed a softer approach “characterised by the objective 
to pursue strategic interests through soft power tools’.12 This represents a remarkable opportunity to 
measure the effects of the two different models followed by the EU towards oil-rich authoritarian 
countries and to draw important lessons for the future. 
After a description of the theoretical framework of the study, the second section will compare 
the characteristics of ENP and EUCAS to evaluate their nature, similarities and differences. The third 
                                                 
9 M. Popescu, ‘Exploring The Limits of The EU’s Normative Power Towards the South Caucasus’, Europolity - Continuity and 
Change in European Governance, vol. 7, no. 1, 2013, p. 59. 
10 European Union External Action Service, Press Release, EU and Kazakhstan sign Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, Astana, 151221, 21 December /2015, retrieved 27 April 2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-
eeas/2015/151221_02_en.htm.  
11 M. Popescu, ‘Exploring The Limits of The EU’s Normative Power, op. cit., p. 59. 
12 T. Mkrtchyan, T. Huseynov, Tabib& K. Gogolashvili, The European Union and the South Caucasus; Three Perspectives on 
the Future of the European Project from the Caucasus, Europe in Dialogue, Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009, p. 64. 
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section will then assess the EU’s influence towards the two states. The model, developed by Vanessa 
Boas,13 will be used in order to demonstrate the limited ideological impact of the EU in Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan. Showing that the EU has a little room of manoeuvre in both states will allow us to 
carry out a comparative analysis of EU’s bilateral relations with the two countries. The fourth section 
will identify what have been the main results of cooperation, respectively in Azerbaijan under the 
ENP and in Kazakhstan under the EUCAS. The conclusion will present the final considerations, an 
analysis on the nature of the EU’s actions, and lessons to be learnt. 
 
1. Theoretical framework and methodology 
The theoretical framework according to which the study will be structured is ‘Normative Power 
Europe’14 (NPE).15 After the end of the Cold War, Europeans agreed on overcoming the Westphalian 
concept of nation state and created the EU, a hybrid supranational form of governance whose legal 
constitution is based on principles of democracy, rule of law, human rights and social justice.16 
Therefore, the most important factor in shaping the EU’s role here is ‘not what it does or what it says, 
but what it is’.17 The EU’s origins, structure and legal constitution define what the EU is, which in 
turn determines how it behaves in its international engagements18. Manners defines this concept as 
the ‘ideational impact’19 of the NPE.   
The notion of ‘normative power’, according to Tumets, has to be considered as the ‘EU 
attempts to project its rules, standards, values and institutions to non-member countries in Europe’s 
periphery’.20 For the aim of this study, the definition of norms is that of ‘intersubjective 
                                                 
13 V. Boas, Who needs goodwill? An analysis of EU norm promotion in the Central Asian context, Univerzita Karlova V Praze 
Fakulta Sociálních Věd, Prague, 2015, p. 17, retrieved 12 April 2016, http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/6647. 
14 I. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vo. 40, no. 2, p. 
236-237. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. p. 241. 
17 Ibid. p. 252. 
18 D. S. Hamilton, ‘The United States: A Normative Power?’, in N. Tocci (ed.), Who Is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The 
European Union and its Global Partners, Brussels, CEPS, 2008, p. 80.  
19 Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, op. cit., p. 238. 
20 M. Pace, ‘Norm shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as a norm entrepreneur in the south?’, Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, vol. 20, no. 4,2007, p. 662. 
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understandings that constitute the actors’ interests and identities, and create expectations as well as 
prescribe what appropriate behaviour ought to be’.21 
As for the definition of norms, the concept of ‘interests’ is essential for this research. Interests 
have to be intended as all the political, economic and strategic priorities without normative 
connotation an actor could have. While according to Tocci normative goals and strategic interests do 
not necessarily contradict each other,22 Smith and Youngs stress the irreconcilable dichotomy 
between the two.23 According to these authors, strategic interests, not norms, shape the EU’s foreign 
policy considerations. The selective way sanctions are imposed for human rights violations in some 
countries has to be considered as a ‘security-predicated rationalism’,24 in contrast with official 
normative declarations.25 
The extent to which norms and interests are balanced in the EU’s external policies is essential 
to distinguish the two main paradigms that will be considered in this study. Indeed, if the EU adopted 
a ‘transition paradigm’ under the ENP framework, for the neighbours of the neighbours in Central 
Asia a ‘pragmatic modernization paradigm’ has been performed. The transition paradigm is a concept 
that defines the core of ENP, which was created on the basis of the enlargement experience. It imitates 
‘key concepts and routines developed in the context of enlargement […] and borrows concrete 
instruments, such as action plans, enhanced monitoring through regular reports and twinning of public 
administration’.26 As the enlargement process, the ‘transition paradigm’ of the ENP has been 
characterized by a demanding approach and a strong conditionality. However, contrary to the 
                                                 
21 A. Björkdahl, ‘Norms in International relations: Some theoretical and methodological reflections’, Cambridge review of 
international affairs, vol. 15, no. 1, 2002, p. 15. 
22 N. Tocci, ‘Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and its Global Partners’, in N. Tocci (ed.), Who Is a 
Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and its Global Partners, Brussels, CEPS, 2008, pp. 5-6.  
23 M. Gabuldani, Master Thesis, ‘Challenges to Democratization beyond the European Union (EU) - Geopolitics Vs Values’, 
Institute for European Studies, 2012, p. 15, retrieved 21 April 2016, http://ies.tsu.edu.ge/data/file_db/Gabuldani/ 
Gabuldani%20MA%20THESIS%20FINAL.pdf.  
24Youngs, Richard, ‘Normative dynamics and strategic interests in the EU‟s external identity’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies,2004, p. 421. 
25 M. Gabuldani, op. cit., p. 15. 
26 S. Lavenex, F. Schimmelfenning, ‘Relations with the Wider Europe’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 44, 2006, p. 
143.  
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enlargement process, in the case of the ENP conditionality was not compensated by attractive and 
clear incentives as the membership perspective. This created tensions with those neighbours that were 
not willing to converge with EU norms and aspired to a more pragmatic and interest-based 
negotiation. 
On the other hand, the ‘pragmatic modernization paradigm’ defines the approach the EU 
adopted in Central Asia. It was clear that in this particular territory, the EU would have had difficulties 
in implementing a ‘transition paradigm’ towards democracy. The EUCAS therefore consists of a 
pragmatic combination of aid, political engagement and economic cooperation, which in the long 
term established stronger ties with Central Asian States. The EU supported those countries’ 
modernization path, pursuing strategic economic and energy objectives alongside an ongoing 
dialogue on human rights and rule of law. 
1.1 Methodology 
The study argues that, due to the lack of leverage and influence towards Caspian Littoral 
States, the EU’s action has not been purely normative, neither under the ENP nor under the EUCAS. 
However, the difference between the ‘transition paradigm’ deployed under the ENP and the 
‘pragmatic modernization paradigm’ adopted in Central Asia led the EU to achieve greater results in 
the cooperation with the latter. 
The final aim is to conceptualise the two different approaches used under the ENP and 
EUCAS, to identify to what extent the two strategies present normative characteristics and what have 
been the reactions of the countries involved. Particular attention is given to both the interaction 
between the EU’s values and interests and to the expectations of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. In fact, 
by adopting a third country perspective, it will be possible not only to understand the EU’s attitude 
and the extent to which it acts to promote its normative agenda, but also how the counterparts interpret 
this engagement, especially when they are not vulnerable to the EU’s influence. The research will 
encompass the whole period of the EU’s involvement in the wider Eastern neighbourhood, starting 
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from the dissolution of the Soviet Union to more recent developments of bilateral relations between 
the EU and the two case studies.  
 
2. Contextual Background: which role for the EU in the Caspian Region? 
This section aims at drawing a preliminary background of the ENP and EUCAS. It will be shown that 
the EUCAS is more flexible and cooperation-oriented than the ENP. 
2.1 The ENP and the Eastern Partnership: the foundations of the ‘transition paradigm’ 
The growing relevance of the EU as a fully-fledged international actor as well as the necessity 
to deal with an entire range of new neighbours after the ‘big bang’ enlargement in 2004 and 2007 led 
to the development of a new ad hoc policy.27 In 2003, the Commission launched the Communication 
‘Wider Europe’,28 paving the way for the Communication of May 2004 ‘Neighbourhood Policy – 
Strategy Paper’, which defines ENP key objectives, procedures and financing tools.29 In line with the 
European Security Strategy of December 2003, ENP aims to ensure ‘political stability, economic 
development and close cooperation’30 with Eastern and Southern neighbours. This approach is based 
on ensuring political stability by favouring regional cooperation, democratisation, economic and 
social development in the countries involved.31  
The ENP architecture is complex, being composed of a unilateral, bilateral and multilateral 
framework of cooperation.32 With regard to the unilateral dimension, Lannon affirms that the ENP, 
having been influenced by the enlargement experience, is a ‘European policy’ and not a Partnership, 
                                                 
27 D. Mahncke, op. cit., p.19-20. 
28 European Commission of the European Union, Communication from The Commission to The Council And The European 
Parliament, Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM 
(2003) 104 final, 11 March 2003, retrieved 26 April 2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf, in D. Mahncke, 
op. cit., p. 23. 
29 European Commission of the European Union, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, COM(2004)373 final, 12 
May 2004, retrieved 25 April 2016, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/ ?uri=CELEX:52004DC0373& 
from=EN. 
30 D. Mahncke, op. cit., p. 26. 
31 Ibid., pp. 26-30. 
32 E. Lannon, ‘Instruments, principes et méthodologie de la Politique européenne de voisinage’, in E. Lannon (ed.), The 
European Neighbourhood Policy’s Challenges, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2013, p. 27. 
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which is defined as ‘a contractual framework which respects the sovereignty of the parties 
involved’.33 Contrary to accession candidate countries, neighbouring countries are not always willing 
to converge with EU norms. However, this did not impede the use of enlargement tools in the ENP, 
which adopted a ‘transition paradigm’ based on ambitious requirements and strong conditionality. 
In particular, the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI), Country Reports (CR) 
and Progress Reports (PR) are characterized by a unilateral logic similar to that of instruments used 
in the enlargement process. Action Plans (AP) concluded with ENP countries after all Member States 
agree by consensus, are inserted in the ENP’s bilateral track, while the multilateral dimension of the 
ENP sets the cooperation respectively in the South, through the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), 
and the East, with the Eastern Partnership (EaP).34  
The EaP was launched by the European Commission at the Prague Summit in 2008.35 It is a 
‘new regional dimension within the ENP’36 where it is possible to distinguish between a bilateral and 
a multilateral track. The former aims at strengthening ties with each ENP country in the political, 
economic and security fields and achieve the signature of Association Agreements (AA). This 
includes the creation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) covering trade in 
goods and services.37 The multilateral track complements the bilateral one through thematic platforms 
used to exchange best practices in four areas: democracy, good governance and stability; economic 
integration and convergence with EU policies; energy security; and contacts between people. In 
parallel, the Flagship initiatives are ‘regional cooperation programmes’38 in the field of SMEs 
support, border management, response to natural and man-made disasters and energy. 
                                                 
33 E. Lannon, ‘Instruments, principes et méthodologie de la Politique européenne de voisinage’, op. cit., p. 27. 
34 Ibid., pp. 30-40. 
35 J. F. Coustillière, ‘La sécurité en Méditerranée : Un état des lieux à la lumière des politiques de sécurité et de défense de l’UE 
et de la Politique européenne de voisinage’, in E. Lannon (ed.), The European Neighbourhood Policy’s Challenges, op. cit., p. 
206. 
36 E. Lannon and P Van Elsuwege, ‘The Eastern Partnership: Prospects of a New Regional Dimension within the European 
Neighbourhood Policy’, in E. Lannon (ed.), The European Neighbourhood Policy’s Challenges, op.cit., p. 285. 
37 Ibid., p. 293. 
38 ‘Eastern Partnership’, ENP and Enlargement Negotiations Website, retrieved 17 April 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ 
neighbourhood/eastern-partnership/index_en.htm. 
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The review of the ENP started in December 2015. After ten years, the original objectives of 
this policy are far from being achieved, and the neighbourhood has been facing great instability. Since 
the very beginning, the policy suffered for being neither an enlargement policy, nor a traditional 
foreign policy. It could not exercise a strong conditionality due to the lack of a real incentive to 
promote values and norms, such as the membership perspective. This led to the failure of the 
‘transition paradigm’ in countries unwilling to adopt a Europeanization path. According to Maier, 
‘normative change and reconstruction of identities or even rejection of norms may occur if the norm 
taker perceives the norms as being imposed by the EU’,39 as the case of Azerbaijan shows. 
2.2 The EUCAS: a way forward a ‘pragmatic modernization approach’ 
On the other side of the Caspian Sea, the EU adopted a different approach towards Central 
Asia. The region is far from the EU and presents unique cultural and social characteristics which 
make difficult for the West to find channels of effective communication to address common 
environmental, security and economic challenges. After the 2004 and 2007 enlargements as well as 
the establishment of the ENP,40 the EU became closer to the region. Energy interests played a 
significant role, the hydrocarbon resources being essential to pursue a strategy of energy supply 
differentiation.41 Moreover, Central Asia countries’ border management with Afghan borders 
addressed security concerns over drug trafficking and religious extremism.42 These objectives acted 
as a catalyst for the creation of the EUCAS, aimed to ‘establish a new partnership’43 with Central 
Asia States on the basis of the following priority areas: human rights and rule of law; youth and 
education; trade and investment; energy and transport; environment and water; and common security 
threats and challenges. 
                                                 
39 S. Gstöhl, ‘The EU as a Norm Exporter?’, in D. Mahncke and S.  Gstöhl (eds.), op. cit., pp. 287-288. 
40 Council of the European union, The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, 10113707, Brussels, 31 May 2007, 
p.1, retrieved 1 April 2016, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010113%202007%20INIT. 
41 N. J. Melvin (ed.), Engaging in Central Asia. The European Union’s New Strategy in the Hearth of Eurasia, Brussels, CEPS, 
2008, pp. 11-15. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Council of the European union, The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, op. cit., p. 1. 
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The EU developed a dual-track approach with Central Asian countries. In the bilateral one, 
the intensity of cooperation was based on each country’s commitment to ‘human rights, economic 
diversification, energy and other sectoral issues, including youth and education’.44 At the regional 
level, the EU has been trying to foster regional cooperation in the Wider European Space, expanding 
energy and transport links. Also, three regional programmes have been promoted in the field of 
education, rule of law, water and environment in which Member States actively take the lead.45  
In 2015, a review occurred for the fourth time in the history of the Strategy. The Council of 
the EU stressed the progressive enhancement of ties with the region, while taking in greater 
consideration the particular characteristics and ambitions of each country.46 The ‘pragmatic 
modernization paradigm’ increased contacts between the EU and Central Asia, paving the way for 
short-term energy and economic interests, as well as the creation of the right conditions to promote 
democracy in the long-term. In this regard, attention to foster economic development, initiatives for 
environment, rule of law and education are essential.47  
2.3 ENP and EUCAS: a comparison of two paradigms 
The ENP, inspired by successful achievements obtained by the enlargement process, was 
designed to create a framework through which EU could exercise its normative influence in the 
neighbourhood, resulting in a ‘transformative policy with strong normative powers’.48 However, the 
EU’s effectiveness was undermined by the lack of the main enlargement incentive: the membership 
                                                 
44Council of the European union, The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, op. cit., p. 6. 
45 Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department, Implementation and review of the European-Union Central 
Asia Strategy: Recommendations for EU action, Brussels, European Parliament, 2016, pp. 8-9, retrieved 12 April 2016, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/535019/EXPO_IDA(2016)535019_EN.pdf. 
46 Council of the European Union, Relations with Central Asia: Council conclusions on the EU Strategy for Central Asia, 
10191/15, Brussels, European Union, 22 June 2015, p. 3, retrieved 12 April 2016, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ 
document/ST-10191-2015-INIT/en/pdf. 
47 F. Bossuyt and P. Kubicek, ‘Advancing Democracy on a Difficult Terrain: EU Democracy Promotion in Central Asia Adjusted 
to Domestic Resonance’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 16, no. 5, 2011, p.  648.  
48 A. Herdina, ‘Approximation of Laws in the Context of the European Neighbourhood Policy—A View from Brussels’, 
European Journal of Law Reform, vol. 9, no. 3, 2007, p. 502, in S. Romaniuk, ‘Not So Wide, Europe: Reconsidering The 
Normative Power of The EU In European Foreign Policy’, Romanian Journal Of European Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010, p. 52. 
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perspective. This resulted in a mismatch between normative expectations and effective cost-benefit 
for neighbours to comply with EU requests.  
In Central Asia, countries were geographically too distant from the EU, hence the approach 
deployed was more rational and focused on building mutually beneficial relations with the 
counterparts, instead of using EU’s ‘ideological impact’.49 The EU did not act as a normative actor 
but decided to offer its support to each country on jointly agreed areas, fostering dialogue and mutual 
understanding. This addressed both economic and energy priorities while maintaining an open 
dialogue on human rights and cooperation in ‘neutral sectors’ such as education, the fight against 
corruption, rule of law and judiciary sector reform. In particular, economic cooperation has been 
considered an important tool for change, leading to deeper bilateral and regional relations and 
enhancing the EU’s presence on the ground.  
In conclusion, despite a similar structure, the ‘pragmatic modernization paradigm’ in Central 
Asia entails a third-country perspective. This proved more flexible than the ‘transition paradigm’ 
represented by the ENP/EaP framework.  
 
3. The Assessment of the EU’s influence towards Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan 
This section aims at assessing to what extent the EU can have a normative impact in Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan. The methodology for the assessment of the EU’s influence will be based on Boas’ use 
of the theory developed by Levitsky and Way to analyse democracy promotion in Central Asia by 
considering three variables: leverage, linkage and organizational power .50 
3.1 Levitsky and Way’s Methodological Framework 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, possibilities of greater democratization promotion 
arose. However, there have been mixed results, with some countries being impenetrable to democratic 
                                                 
49 I. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, op. cit., p. 238. 
50 V. Boas, op. cit., pp. 17-66. 
12 
 
values.  Levitsky and Way’s study on the post-Cold War period51 used leverage, linkage and 
organizational power to explain when democracy arises. The first two address international factors 
shaping internal democratic shift, while the third one is based on domestic variables.  
‘Western leverage’52 is defined as ‘vulnerability of governments to external democratizing 
pressure’.53 Three variables impact Western leverage: ‘the size and strength of countries’ states and 
economies’,54 ‘competing Western foreign policy objectives’,55 and the ‘existence or not of 
countervailing powers’.56  
‘Linkage of the West’57 is the second variable influencing the normative impact of the West. 
It refers to: ‘the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organisational) and cross-
border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and information) between particular countries 
and the U.S., the EU, and Western-dominated multilateral institutions’.58  
‘Organisational power’59 focuses on domestic factors. It assesses to what extent autocratic 
governments are able to survive despite a significant rise from below thanks to their strong internal 
organization.60 Three main elements measure the organizational power: the coercive capacity ‘to 
monitor, intimidate, and when necessary, repress opponents’,61 party strength and controlled popular 
movements;62 and the regime’s control of the economy.63 
                                                 
51 S. Levitsky and L. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Dynamics of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold 
War Era, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 23. 
52 S. Levitsky and L. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Dynamics of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold 
War Era, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 27. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. p. 28. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., p. 27. 
57 S. Levitsky and L. Way, op. cit., p. 30. 
58 Ibid., p.31. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., p. 46. 
61 Ibid., p. 48. 
62 Ibid., p. 55. 
63 Ibid., p. 61. 
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3.2 Operationalisation of variables 
Normative influence will be the dependent variable of the assessment. The three independent 
variables are leverage, linkage and organizational power, each of them composed of so-called 
‘constituent components’. It is important to stress that leverage and linkage are directly proportional 
to the EU’s influence. The higher they are () the greater will be EU’s influence (). In contrast, 
organizational power is indirectly proportional: the greater each country’s organisational power is, 
the less the EU’s influence will be effective. Table 1 shows the preliminary structure of the one that 
will be presented at the end of the assessment. 
 
Table 1 - Assessment of Leverage, Linkage and Organisational Power 
Variable 
Constituent Components of the 
Variable 
Impact on EU’s influence64 
 
Leverage () 
 
 
Economic vulnerability  
To be assessed Cohesive MS priorities 
Lack of competing International Powers 
 
Linkage () 
Economic linkage of flows and trade  
 
To be assessed 
Diplomatic linkage 
Civil Society linkage 
Presence of EU on the ground 
 
Organizational 
Power () 
State coercive capacity 
 
To be assessed 
Party Strength 
Control of State’s Economy 
 
 
Source: elaborated on the basis of V. Boas65 
3.3 The EU’s normative influence in Azerbaijan: Leverage, Linkage and Organizational power 
This section aims at assessing the EU’s normative influence in Azerbaijan using the three 
variables identified by Levitsky and Way, namely leverage, linkage and organizational power.  
                                                 
64 The final Table presenting the results of the assessment can be found at p. 20 of the present work. 
65 V. Boas, op. cit., pp. 128-183. 
LEGEND RESULTS ASSESSMENT:  
[+]      If a variable results effectively in increasing EU’s influence  
[+/-]     if there is a minor result of the variable on EU’s influence 
[-]        If there is a negative impact on EU’s influence 
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Western Leverage 
With regard to Western Leverage, the high economic independence of Azerbaijan, Member 
States’ disagreements over energy interests and norms’ promotion as well as the presence of strong 
concurrent actions determine a negative assessment (-), which directly undermines the EU’s influence 
on Azerbaijan. Concerning economic vulnerability, after the economic crisis experienced following 
the collapse of the USSR, the country managed its economic recovery.66 Up to now, Azerbaijan is 
undergoing significant growth, which in parallel with the economic differentiation strategy and the 
increased attention for renewable energies stresses the independence of Baku’s economy. If an EU 
economic leverage exists, it is determined by the fact that the EU is one of the main partners of 
Azerbaijan in energy cooperation. However, this could also be considered a weakness for the EU 
itself, which nowadays is trying to pursue a differentiation of energy supply, where the role of Baku 
as an energy supply country is central (-).  
The EU MS’ cohesion variable is equally weak. The presence of important energy resources 
in Azerbaijan and its feeble performance in terms of human rights created a division among those MS 
attracted by Baku’s energy resources (notably Hungary and Italy) and those (led by Sweden) that 
condemn Azerbaijan’s human rights violations.67 Therefore, the assessment of this constituent 
component is negatively assessed (-).  
Finally, with regard to the presence of a competing international powers’ sub-variable, 
many different international players are interested in exerting an influence over the country. Thanks 
to its energy resources, as well as cultural and ethnic ties with Russia, Turkey and Iran, Azerbaijan 
managed to perform a multi-vector foreign policy68 which undermined EU’s influence (-).  
                                                 
66 International Energy Agency, Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, Paris, OECD/IEA, 2014, p. 65. 
67 G. Merabishvili, The EU and Azerbaijan: Game on for a more normative policy? ,CEPS Policy Brief, no. 329, 2015, p. 
4,https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/PB329%20EU%20Policy%20towards%20Azerbaijan%20G%20Merabishvili.pdf. 
68 E. Nuriyev, ‘Azerbaijan and the European Union: new landmarks of strategic partnership in the South Caucasus–Caspian 
basin’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 2008, p. 157. 
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Linkage 
Despite the positive effect of the EU’s presence on the ground, the limited linkage performed 
by the EU at the economic, intergovernmental and social levels leads to the conclusion that this 
variable assessment results in a neutral value (+/-).  
Economic linkage exists between the EU and Azerbaijan. The EU is the main trade partner 
and bilateral exchanges are regulated through the PCA which entered into force in 1999.69 The EU 
accounts for more than 40% of Azerbaijan’s total trade; exports toward European markets are around 
50% and imports from the EU are more than 25%.70 However, due to the fact Azerbaijan is not a 
WTO member and has alternative sources of trade and commerce, the EU’s economic influence is 
slightly undermined, resulting in a neutral evaluation of this constituent variable (+/-).  
Referring to diplomatic linkage, Azerbaijan is part of several Western organizations, 
including the Council of Europe. However, it also participates in the Organization of Islamic 
Conference and other non-Western-led organizations.71 Baku is one of the founding members of 
GUUAM, an alliance at the political, economic and strategic aimed at enhancing Post-Soviet 
countries independence from Russia, which constitutes an important platform to debate over security, 
transport and energy issues.72 Therefore, Western diplomatic links exist but they are not exclusive 
(+/-).  
The third variable, civil society linkage, is equally weak. Civil society started evolving after 
Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991, thanks to a liberal regulation of NGOs adopted in 2000.73 
However, the situation evolved differently (+/-). In February 2014, the ‘Law on Grants’ and the one 
                                                 
69 ‘Azerbaijan’, European Commission website, October 2015, retrieved 22 April 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/ 
countries-and-regions/countries/azerbaijan. 
70 Ibid. 
71 ‘General Information On The Section: Azerbaijan In International Scene’, Azerbaijan.Az, retrieved 22 April 2016, 
http://www.azerbaijan.az/_WorldCommunity/_GeneralInfo/_generalInfo_e.html. 
72 ‘Organization for Democracy and Economic Development - GUAM’, GlobalSecurity.org, retrieved 22 April 2016, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/guuam.htm. 
73 The International Center for Not-for- profit Law (ICNL), NGO Law Monitor: Azerbaijan, 23 March 2016, retrieved 22 April 
2016, http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/azerbaijan.html. 
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on ‘State Registration of Legal entities’ were amended to limit registration procedures and grants74. 
In 2013, many dialogues on human rights took place,75 but between 2014 and 2015 further limitations 
occurred, repression being extended even to mobilisation through the Web.76 These restrictions are 
in line with the government’s aim to maintain internal stability and secure its power from civil society 
opposition.77 The only positive element in linkage is the EU’s strong presence on the ground, through 
a fully-fledged delegation (+).  
Organisational Power 
Azerbaijan disposes of a consistent organizational power that has been evaluated positively in 
all its variables (+). It is important to remember that unlike leverage and linkage, organizational power 
is indirectly proportional: the greater this independent variable is, the lower is the dependent one, 
notably the EU’s influence. Coercive capacity has been developing in Azerbaijan since the beginning 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1988, and when President Ilham Aliyev came into power, 
military spending further increased.78 Military forces are the main tools for the government to secure 
its power, and their internal fragmentation avoids the empowerment of leading military figures that 
could pose a threat to the establishment.79 This resulted in a positive evaluation of this constituent 
component (+).  
With regard to state party, political power in Azerbaijan is completely concentrated in the 
hands of President Aliyev, who controls the national party – New Azerbaijan Party- which won the 
parliamentary elections held in 2010.80 Political opposition has been progressively undermined 
                                                 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 European Commission of the European Union, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Azerbaijan. 
Progress in 2014 and recommendations for actions, SWD (2015) 64 final, Brussels, 25 March 2015, p.6, retrieved 17 April 
2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2015/azerbaijan-enp-report-2015_en.pdf. 
77 G. Merabishvili, op. cit., p. 3. 
78 International Crisis Group, ‘Azerbaijan: Defence Sector Management and Reform’, Europe Briefing no. 50, 29 October 2008, 
p. 2, retrieved 22 April 2016, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/b50_azerbaijan___defence_sector_ 
management_and_reform.pdf. 
79 Ibid. 
80 J. Lecarte, Azerbaijan: Human Rights Situation, European Parliament Research Service Blog, October 2014, retrieved 22 
April 2016, https://epthinktank.eu/2014/10/13/azerbaijan-human-rights-situation/. 
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through the amendment of the Electoral Code in 2009, which adopted stricter criteria for campaign 
finance support81. Together with restrictions to freedom of assembly and NGOs as well as widespread 
arrests, political activists are fragmented and unable to take a strong stand against the ruling party 
(+).82  
Finally, the government has the complete control over Azerbaijan’s economy, in particular 
its energy resources. Over time, this perpetrates its power and consolidates oligarchic structures (+).  
3.4 EU’s normative influence in Kazakhstan 
In this section the same analysis of the previous one will be performed in order to measure 
EU’s normative influence in Kazakhstan. 
Western Leverage 
With regard to Western wLeverage, Kazakhstan’s economy is strongly independent. The 
position of Member States is fragmented, and the presence of several international actors undermines 
EU’s influence (-). The country assessment is negative in terms of economic vulnerability (-), thanks 
to the presence of hydrocarbon resources and a high rate of oil exports that led Kazakhstan to become 
the second strongest economy in the post-Soviet Space after Russia,83 as well as one of the world’s 
ten fastest-growing economies according to the International Monetary Fund.84  
At the same time, there are diverse strategic priorities within Member States of the EU, 
linked to energy and business opportunities, as well as to EU border management to face drug 
trafficking and international crime.85 This created a division between Member States criticizing 
human rights violations and those claiming that a pragmatic involvement is better than not pursuing 
                                                 
81‘Freedom in the world – Azerbaijan’, Freedom House website, 2015, retrieved 22 April 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/ 
report/freedom-world/2015/azerbaijan. 
82 Ibid. 
83 M. Emerson and J. Boonstra (eds.), Into Eurasia: Monitoring the EU’s Central Asia Strategy – Report of the EUCAM Project, 
Brussels, CEPS, Madrid, FRIDE, 2010, pp.16-18. 
84 International Energy Agency, Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, op. cit., p. 163. 
85 J. Gower, ‘EU Member States in Central Asia’, in A. Warkotsch (ed.), The European Union and Central Asia, Oxon, 
Routledge, 2011, p. 34. 
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any initiative and isolating Central Asian states (Germany,86 UK87 and France88). This contrast 
between pragmatic and normative interests determined the lack of a common vision on how to 
structure future relation with the country, resulting in a negative assessment (-).  
In parallel, the presence of competing international actors is still significant, thus 
undermining the EU’s influence (-). Russia is still present,89 aiming to secure trade relations as well 
as border management, energy and political ties.90 China’s companies are deeply involved in the 
Kazakh economy, particularly in the energy field.91 US engagement started during military operations 
in Afghanistan92 and progressively decreased alongside its normative agenda. On the other hand, the 
presence of Turkey93 and Iran became stronger.  
Linkage 
The linkage the EU can have vis-à-vis Kazakhstan is neutral (+/-). Strong economic flows are 
present, with 40% of Kazakh total external trade directed towards the European market.94 Considering 
the EU’s relations with Russia and the greater emphasis the EU put on the differentiation of energy 
supply, Central Asia became critical. The EU increased foreign direct investments (FDI) in 
Kazakhstan up to almost half of the total FDI targeting the country.95The accession of Astana to the 
WTO96 and the signature of the EPCA constitute further signals of commitment in developing 
mutually beneficial economic exchanges. The fact that Kazakhstan signed the agreement with the EU 
despite being a member of the Eurasian Economic Union indicates possible future cooperation 
                                                 
86 Ibid., pp. 34-37. 
87 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department, The EU in Central Asia: The regional context, European 
Parliament, 2016, p. 5, retrieved 22 April 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/535020/ 
EXPO_IDA(2016)535020_EN.pdf. 
90 Ibid., 36. 
91 Ibid p. 41 
92 Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department, The EU in Central Asia: The regional context, op. cit., p. 7. 
93 M. Emerson, J. Boosra, op. cit., p. 47-48. 
94‘Kazakhstan’, European Commission website, October 2015, retrieved 21 April 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/ 
countries-and-regions/countries/kazakhstan/. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
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between the EU and the Eurasian Union, thus the positive assessment of the economic constituent 
component (+).   
In terms of diplomatic linkage, Kazakhstan participates in several international and regional 
organizations that strengthen its diplomatic linkage with the West. Among others, it benefits from 
OECD programmes for market liberalization,97 cooperates with the Council of Europe98 and is a 
member of NATO since 1990s.99 The country is also part of non-Western-led organizations, notably 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Union, the Organisation of 
Islamic Conference as well as the Central Asian Cooperation Organization.100 This results in a neutral 
mark for this sub-variable (+/-). 
Referring to the civil society linkage, the rise of a civil society has always been promoted by 
Western donors. Nevertheless, internal ethnic divisions, the lack of an historical tradition of political 
activism, and the strict control exercised by the government on international financing101 hampered 
further advancements. NGOs’ role is accepted more in the social than the political sphere.102 
According to the MoJ, approximately 42% of the 36,815 registered non-governmental organizations 
provide services in the social sphere, 24 % protect socially vulnerable groups, while 34% focus on 
human rights promotion.103 In addition, an NGO Law has been approved in 2015 to regulate 
organizations’financial support through an operator deciding over international and domestic 
contributions.104 Despite these restrictive trends, civil society organizations are still present and 
active. The EU-Kazakhstan seminar for Civil Society takes place annually, gathering experts and 
                                                 
97 ‘Kazakhstan’, OECD website, 2016, retrieved 21 April 2016, http://www.oecd.org/countries/kazakhstan/.  
98 ‘Kazakhstan, Council of Europe website ,2016, retrieved 21 April 2016, http://www.coe.int/en/web/programmes/kazakhstan. 
99 V. Boas, op. cit., p. 131. 
100 Ibid., p. 132. 
101 ‘The situation of civil society in Central Asia: Key concerns and recommendations’, Briefing for human rights seminar 
organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 22-23, October 2015’, 
International Partnership for Human Rights, 2015, pp. 1-2, retrieved 21 April 2016, http://iphronline.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/ENG-briefing-CA-civil-society-Oct-2015.pdf. 
102 L. Abdusalyamova, NGOs in Central Asia, Alliance Magazine, 2002, retrieved 22 April 2016, 
http://www.alliancemagazine.org/feature/ngos-in-central-asia/. 
103 A. Kabdiyeva, ‘Development of NGOs in Kazakhstan’, European Journal of Business and Social Sciences, vol. 4, no. 02, 
May 2015, p. 163.  
104 J. Lillis, Kazakhstan: NGO Law Approved Amid Civil Society Resistance, Eurasianet, December 2015, retrieved 21 April 
2016, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/76366. 
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NGOs representatives from both parts to exchange opinions and best practices as well as to suggest 
new ideas for governmental activities in the field of human rights.105 On these bases, the assessment 
of this element is neutral (+/-).  
Finally, EU presence on the ground is evaluated positively (+), with the first fully-fledged 
Central Asia EU delegation being established in Kazakhstan in 1994. 
Organisational Power 
The third variable registered a positive outcome (+). With its equipment and skilled, 
independent military forces,106 Kazakhstan has the most prominent and efficient contract-based army 
in Central Asia.107 Astana also disposes of a structured and powerful state party, Nur Otan, run by 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev since December 1991.108 Other political groups are disaggregated, 
and the strong division in clans further impedes the creation of a Western electoral system. 
Governmental control over the economy is neutrally assessed (+/-), as the government-led energy 
export policy yielded significant growth to the country’s economy.109 However, recently the 
government has started a process of privatization and differentiation to overcome Kazakhstan’s 
dependence on energy exports after the fall of oil prices.110 
3.4 Conclusion: low/moderate influence for the EU in the wider neighbourhood 
It is evident that the EU’s influence on Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan is negatively impacted by 
each of the constituent components considered for evaluating the independent variables. The results 
are summarized in Table 2. 
                                                 
105 EU Delegation of the European Union to Kazakhstan, EU-Kazakhstan Civil Society Seminar on Human Rights kicks off in 
Astana today, Astana, 25 November 2015, retrieved 21 April 2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/press_corner/ 
all_news/news/2015/20151125_01_en.htm. 
106 D. Gorenburg ‘External Support for Central Asian Military and Security Forces’, Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, vol. 26, no. 1, p. 2. 
107 Ibid., p. 7. 
108‘Kazakhstan’, Freedom House website, 2015, retrieved 21 April 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2015/kazakhstan. 
109 V. Boas, op. cit., p. 75. 
110 M. Desai and E. Wheeler, Can Kazakhstan’s Privatization Plan Succeed?, The Diplomat, February 2016, retrieved 21 April 
2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/can-kazakhstans-privatization-plan-succeed/. 
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Table 2 - Result of the Assessment of Leverage, Linkage and Organisational Power on EU’s influence 
in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan 
Variable Components 
Assessment 
Impact on 
Influence 
AZ KZ AZ KZ 
Leverage 
() 
Economic vulnerability - -  
- 
 
- Cohesive MS priorities - - 
Lack of competing International Powers - - 
Linkage 
() 
Economic linkage of flows and trade +/- +/-  
+/- 
 
+/- Diplomatic linkage +/- +/- 
Civil Society linkage +/- +/- 
Presence of EU on the ground + + 
Organizational 
Power 
() 
State coercive capacity 
+ + - - 
Party Strength 
+ + 
Control of State’s Economy 
+ +/- 
Source: elaborated on the basis of V. Boas111 
 
4. Performance of ENP and EUCAS in EU bilateral cooperation with Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan 
It has been assessed above that the EU is not able to exert sufficient influence in its bilateral relations 
with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. This fourth section will now analyse the effects of the ‘transition 
paradigm’ of ENP and the ‘pragmatic modernization approach’ of EUCAS towards Baku and Astana. 
The objective is to understand the nature and the results that the EU can obtain in its bilateral 
engagement with these countries under these two different approaches. The assessment will be done 
comparing EU’s requests and the results achieved in three areas of cooperation: human rights, 
                                                 
111 V. Boas, op. cit., pp. 128-183. 
LEGEND: 
[+]      If a variable results effectively in increasing EU’s influence 
[+/-]     if there is a minor result of the variable on EU’s influence 
[-]        If there is a negative impact on EU’s influence 
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economic and energy cooperation and rule of law. Table 3 shows the possible results of the 
assessment for each area. 
Table 3 - Legend of bilateral cooperation assessment results 
ASSESSMENT 
RESULT 
EXPLANATION 
+ The paradigm produced good results in bilateral cooperation 
+/- 
The paradigm produced minor results in bilateral 
cooperation 
- 
The paradigm did not produce advancements in bilateral 
cooperation  
Source: Author’s elaboration 
4.1 ENP/EaP and Azerbaijan: the normative failure of the ‘transition paradigm’ 
The literature is consistent in affirming that the basic features of the ENP have been inspired 
by the enlargement toolkit. However, as previously emphasised, the EU’s action towards its 
neighbours lacks one of the most important incentives of the enlargement process, notably the 
possibility to become a Member State. Underestimating this factor, the development of the ENP and 
EaP led to a demanding ‘transition paradigm’ towards EU neighbours, characterized by 
overambitious requirements and a lack of clear incentives. This resulted in a division within the 
Eastern neighbourhood between those countries that advanced in their bilateral cooperation with the 
EU - Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – and those that did not. Azerbaijan is part of the latter group 
and is considered by Franke as the ‘least-likely case’ for Neighbourhood Europeanization.112 This is 
particularly evident when analysing bilateral cooperation results in the area of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. In the European Commission’s Progress Report evaluating the 
implementation of the ENP in Azerbaijan, it was stressed the inability to conform to ECHR rulings 
                                                 
112 A. Franke, A. Gawrich, I. Melnykovska, and R. Schweicker, ‘The European Union’s relation with Ukraine and Azerbaijan’, 
Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 26, no. 2, 2010, p. 156. 
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related to violations of freedom of association and expression as well as lack of free and fair 
elections.113 The recent legislation on NGOs poses a serious threat to freedom of association, 
expression and reunion, due to burdensome administrative procedures for registration of targeted 
associations and restrictive criteria on international financial support.114 The arrest, menace and 
persecution of political opponents, journalists and human rights activists is a consolidated practice115 
together with the adoption of restrictive laws on freedom of religion, the European Commission 
says.116 The misalignment of Azerbaijan from human rights’ standards and freedoms results in a 
negative assessment of this field of cooperation (-). 
The lack of consistent progress in the area of democracy, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms contrasts sharply with developments in the economic sphere.117 Azerbaijan is not member 
of the WTO and does not meet the preconditions to deepen economic exchanges with the EU.118 This 
led energy cooperation to be central. After the Ukraine crisis, Brussels declared the objective of 
pursuing an energy supply differentiation. Baku is aware of its potential as a transit and supply 
country between Europe and Central Asia and used its hydrocarbon resources as a tool for its multi-
vector foreign policy.119 At the bilateral level, a memorandum of understanding on energy (MoUE) 
between the EU and Azerbaijan was signed in 2006,120 establishing regular meetings to advance in 
legislation harmonization, security of supply and technical cooperation.121 At the multilateral level, 
                                                 
113 European Commission of the European Union, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Azerbaijan. 
Progress in 2014 and recommendations for actions, op. cit., p. 4. 
114 Ibid., p. 3. 
115 P. Borgoltz, G. Bonacquisti, Droits de l’homme et Etat de droit dans le voisinage oriental de l’Union Européenne (Europe 
de l’Est et Asie Centrale) dans le contexte de la révision de la Politique Européenne de Voisinage, Institut Européen Des 
Relations Internationales Academia Diplomatica Europaea (IERI), June 2015, pp. 8-9, retrieved 23 April 2016, 
http://www.ieri.be/sites/default/files/filefield/news/Droits%20de%20l'homme%20%20etat%20de%20droit%2028%20mai%20
EU%20LOGOS%20final.pdf. 
116 European Commission of the European Union, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Azerbaijan, op. 
cit., p.6. 
117 Ibid., p. 3. 
118 V. Gasimli, ‘Trade, economic and energy cooperation: challenges for a fragmented region’, in Fuad Chiragov et al. (ed.), op. 
cit., p. 61. 
119 T. Huseynov, ‘The EU and Azerbaijan: Destination Unclear’, in T. Mkrtchyan, T. Huseynov and K. Gogolashvili (eds.), op. 
cit., p. 65. 
120 Ibid.  
121 European Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan, ‘Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership between the 
Republic of Azerbaijan and the European Union in the Field of Energy’, Brussels, 6 November 2006, retrieved 23 April 2016, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/international/regional/caucasus_central_asia/memorandum/doc/mou_azerbaijan_en.p
df. 
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Azerbaijan is part of the INOGATE Programme, created in 1995 to foster energy cooperation 
between the wider neighbourhood in the east.122 In 2004 the country hosted the Baku Energy 
Ministerial Conference where the initiative was launched, paving the way for a closer cooperation 
between the EU, the Black Sea and Central Asian countries.123  
The progress report released by the Commission in 2015 also welcomed the positive 
developments deriving from the increasing interest in renewable energies,124 although gas remains a 
prominent source of revenues for the country. The production reached 18,7 billion cubic meters of 
gas (bcm).125 Interestingly, the EU already secured the import of 10 bcm of gas from Azerbaijan 
starting 2019.126 This is in line with both the launch of the Southern Gas Corridor in 2014127 and the 
construction of the two new pipelines, notably the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) 
and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which are expected to be completed by 2019/2020.128 In 
conclusion, there has been great cooperation in the energy sector, but this is not directly connected 
with Baku’s participation to the ENP. Therefore, the assessment of this independent variable is 
positive (+), but it does not have a positive impact on the effectiveness of the ‘transition paradigm’. 
Concerning rule of law, whose characterising elements are constitutional primacy, separation 
of power, access to justice and independence of the judiciary,129 there have not been relevant 
improvements in Azerbaijan (-). The Constitution adopted in 1995 guarantees a wide range of human 
                                                 
122 F. Fenton, ‘State of Play: The EU, Central Asia and ENP’, in Sieglinde, Gstöhl and Erwan, Lannon (eds.), The Neighbours 
of the European Union's Neighbours: Diplomatic and Geopolitical Dimensions Beyond the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
Oxon, Routledge, 2016, p. 169. 
123 ‘Energy & transport international relations, Baku Initiative’, Directorate General Energy and Transport, 2006, retrieved 30 
March 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/international/regional/caspian/energy_en.htm. 
124 European Commission, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Azerbaijan, op. cit., p. 12.  
125 Ibid. 
126 European Commission of the European Union, Press Release, Gas from Azerbaijan: Commission welcomes final investment 
decision to extract gas pledged for Europe, Brussels, 17 December 2013, retrieved 3 April 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-1271_en.htm. 
127 Ibid. 
128 ‘TANAP to start working on July 1, 2019 and TAP – on January 1, 2020’. ABC.AZ, 6 July 2015, retrieved 23 April 2016, 
http://abc.az/eng/news_06_07_2015_89416.html.  
129 E. Schlaeppi, B. and C, McCabe, Rule of law, Justice sector Reforms and development cooperation, SDC Concept Paper, 
Berne, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA, 2008, p. 5. 
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rights that are not properly implemented in practice.130 According to Freedom House, there is no clear 
separation of powers, the Constitutional Court being highly dependent on the government.131 Finally, 
there is a lack of equality before the law, many people being deprived of the possibility to ask for a 
defence lawyer.132 Episodes of ‘torture and ill treatment’ in pre-trial detention are also signalled.133 
In parallel, the public sector is characterized by high levels of corruption, which make difficult to 
establish efficient legislative, administrative and justice workings in the country.134 
Table 4 -  Results of Transition Paradigm in Azerbaijan 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
According to the analyses in this section summarized in Table 4, it is possible to affirm that 
the country is not undertaking the democratization path that would be expected according to the ENP 
and EaP requirements. The ‘transition paradigm’ has been interpreted as an intrusion into domestic 
affairs, leading to Baku’s refusal to ratify the Association Agreement and to propose an alternative 
instrument where Azerbaijan would play the role of partner, not the one of neighbour.135 Moreover, 
the lack of compliance to apply normative requests did not lead to any negative consequence, also 
due to the weak implementation of the ‘transition paradigm’ in concrete terms.136 Baku’s position as 
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Area of Cooperation Cooperation with 
Azerbaijan 
Effectiveness of the 
Transition Paradigm 
Human Rights - 
 
- Economic/Energy Cooperation 
+ 
Rule of Law - 
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an energy supplier and connector between the EU and Central Asia further increased its negotiation 
power, leading the country to believe that the EU needs to cooperate ‘as much as Azerbaijan’.137   
4.2 EUCAS and Kazakhstan: the results of a pragmatic modernization approach 
Kazakhstan is generally considered difficult terrain for a democratization process. However, 
this did not impede Brussels to cooperate with the country and the entire region in a more nuanced 
way. The main drivers for commitment were economic, energy and security interests related to 
hydrocarbon resources and trade, despite the normative goals that were declared in the PCAs 
concluded in the 1990s138 and in the EUCAS.139 Many scholars underline the ineffectiveness of EU’s 
democracy promotion in Central Asia, which presents ‘consolidated autocracies’ and a poor record 
of human rights violations.140 However, critiques are based on the normative bias that usually defines 
the EU’s official external commitment. If we assume that the approach to the region is not normative 
in substance, the evaluation changes. Indeed, the EU did not use its ideational nature to deal with 
Kazakhstan, since a strong normative stand would have undermined any advance in bilateral 
cooperation. Instead, it cooperated with Astana on different terms according to a ‘pragmatic 
modernisation paradigm’. The operationalization of this concept will occur through the same 
variables analysed in the previous section. The assessment will be done considering the impact 
expected to be created by the EUCAS, that in this case is not a democratic shift – as in the ENP/EaP 
– but the establishment of cooperation in all the sectors mentioned.  
Concerning human rights cooperation, one of the provisions in the EUCAS in 2007 was the 
establishment of ‘regular, results-oriented human right dialogues’ carried out by MS and the EU at 
the bilateral level with each country.141This initiative was not intended to promote a normative shift 
in the short-term, but to establish a structured platform for discussion and cooperation. Up to now, 
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seven rounds of Human Rights Dialogues (HRD) have taken place. The last one occurred in Astana 
in 2015.142 Despite several challenges, progress has been made in Kazakhstan in the fight against 
torture, and a number of imprisoned human rights and labour activists have been released after the 
HRD held in Brussels in 2014.143 Also, in 2015 the government adopted a ‘National Action Plan to 
2020 on Human Rights’, following the recommendations of the United Nations Universal Periodic 
Review.144 Considering the attitude of Kazakhstan towards human rights, the outcome can be 
evaluated positively in the sense that a dialogue has been established and the openness of Astana on 
these matters is clear (+).  
The same can be said with regard to economic and energy cooperation. Relations between 
Brussels and Astana progressively improved over the last 20 years.145 The EU has become one of 
Kazakhstan’s biggest trade partners and investors, supporting Astana in its efforts to pursue economic 
diversification, and business reinforcement.146 The accession of Kazakhstan to the WTO, – a 
necessary precondition to foster commercial ties between the two parties –147 occurred on 30 
November 2015.148 In parallel, Kazakhstan participates in TRACEA and INOGATE programmes, as 
does Azerbaijan. It also concluded an MoU in the field of energy with the EU in 2006.149 Commitment 
in supporting Kazakhstan in investment attraction, transparency, transport interconnections and 
business development has been restated as a priority in the review of the EUCAS in June 2015, and 
the EPCA is a further step forward. Kazakhstan considers the EU as a model to follow in its 
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modernization path. The EU has presented itself as a reliable partner without imperialistic or military 
aspirations, unlike Russia and China. This has been essential to establish mutual confidence. The 
assessment is therefore positive (+). 
Concerning the last variable, Kazakhstan is commonly defined as an authoritarian regime 
which does not have any of the fundamental rule of law requirements.150 Nevertheless, the pragmatic 
approach performed by the EU led Kazakhstan to make notable advancements, despite the presence 
of several areas requiring further assistance and discussion. Under the EUCAS framework, the 
country is part of the Rule of Law Initiative led by France and Germany, that support modernization, 
reform and harmonization through political dialogue and technical support.151 A Rule of Law 
Platform has been created to foster exchange of best practices between countries. Up to now, 
representatives of Central Asia states at the ministerial level met in in Brussels (2008), Dushanbe 
(2010), Brussels (2012) and Astana (2014).152Within the framework of the Council of Europe, the 
country joined the European Commission for Democracy through Law, whose aim is to pursue a legal 
and institutional harmonization in line with European standards.153 In parallel, the reform of Kazakh 
Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code stated for the first time the principle of convicted 
people’s reinsertion into society as a priority,154 and access to justice has been improved to ensure 
gender equality, protection of young people and vulnerable groups.155 Since these advancements have 
to be followed through the concrete implementation of legislative provisions amended or adopted, 
continuous exchange and dialogue between Kazakhstan and EU Member States is essential. To 
conclude, the outcomes achieved meet totally the aim of the EU: the establishment of mutual trust 
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and gradual harmonization on the basis of Kazakhstan’s expectations. The positive outcomes of the 
cooperation led to a positive assessment (+), with Table 5 summarizing the results. 
Table 5 - Results of Pragmatic Modernization Paradigm in Kazakhstan 
Area of Cooperation Results in 
Kazakhstan 
Effectiveness of Pragmatic 
Modernization Paradigm 
Human Rights + 
 
+ 
Economic/Energy 
Cooperation 
+ 
Rule of Law + 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Promoting a truly revolutionary democratic transition in Kazakhstan was simply not possible 
due to the EU’s limited influence. Moreover, the engagement in Central Asia was mainly driven by 
pragmatic interests. For these reasons, the EU did not act as a normative power but decided to perform 
a more pragmatic approach based on dialogue and best practices exchange on human rights and rule 
of law, alongside trade and energy cooperation. Since the objective of the EU was not to impose its 
norms and values but to enter into a constructive dialogue with Kazakhstan, the outcomes have been 
positive in all the fields analysed, thus underlining the success of the ‘pragmatic modernization 
paradigm’, which managed to find a balance between interests and value promotion in a difficult 
terrain. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to analyse to what extent EU’s action towards the oil-rich 
Caspian Littoral States had normative characteristics. The EU’s bilateral cooperation with Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan has been examined to assess the nature and effectiveness of respectively the ENP/EaP 
‘transition paradigm’ and the EUCAS ‘pragmatic modernization paradigm’. The hypothesis was that 
30 
 
EU’s action towards the two sides of the Caspian Region is not normative in substance, but that the 
pragmatic modernization paradigm performed well in Kazakhstan, achieving greater results than 
those achieved through the ENP/EaP in Azerbaijan.  
The analysis has demonstrated that Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are not vulnerable to the EU’s 
‘ideational model’, and neither of the paradigms has been purely normative. The ENP has always 
been presented as a ‘transformative policy with normative characteristics’.156 However, the EU 
normative foreign policy has been inconsistent towards Baku in substance, since cooperation 
advanced only in limited areas linked to economic and strategic interests of both parts, undermining 
the EU’s normative commitment. From a third country perspective, the ‘transition paradigm’ has 
been perceived as a threat to national sovereignty by Baku, which decided to step back from the 
Association Agreement signature, asking for a ‘Strategic Modernization Agreement’157 that would 
present Baku as a real partner.158 
The EUCAS did not have normative connotation either, but the difference with the ENP has 
been in the approach adopted. The combination of interests and norms determined significant 
improvements with Kazakhstan, increasing its willingness to cooperate with the EU. Despite the 
approach not being normative in the meaning we would normally attribute to this word, the 
cooperation resulted in Astana being the first Central Asian country to conclude an EPCA with the 
EU159. This will be the new legal basis fostering political and economic cooperation, including a 
greater commitment in the field of human rights, democracy and rule of law. The difference with 
Azerbaijan is striking and can be explained by the different combination of values and interests 
promoted. 
                                                 
156 A. Herdina, ‘Approximation of Laws in the Context of the European Neighbourhood Policy—A View from Brussels’, op. 
cit., p. 52. 
157 F. Mammadov, ‘Azerbaijan's foreign policy – A new paradigm of careful pragmatism’, in F. Chiragov et al. (eds.), op. cit., 
p. 33. 
158 G. Merabishvili, op. cit., p. 3 
159 European Union External Action Service, Press Release, EU and Kazakhstan sign Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, Astana, 151221, 21 December /2015, retrieved 27 April 2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-
eeas/2015/151221_02_en.htm.  
31 
 
Considering these findings, the hypothesis of the present work has been proven correct. 
Neither the ENP nor EUCAS hold a normative nature. However, the pragmatic modernization 
approach, thanks to its greater focus on cooperation and the right combination of interests and norms, 
has been more successful in meeting both the EU and the third country objectives.   
In light of the new bilateral engagement between Baku and Brussels, the present work 
recommends to look at the way in which relations with Kazakhstan have been framed under the 
EUCAS. Indeed, similarities between Baku and Astana in terms of moderate/low EU’s influence, 
energy interests and geographical location lead one to conclude that in dealing with both these 
countries, the EU would achieve better results through the ‘pragmatic modernization paradigm’. 
A process of internal transformation cannot be obtained without a long-term commitment and 
willingness to know each other. A different and more realistic engagement characterized by a third 
country perspective and focused on neutral areas of cooperation – private sector, education, research 
and innovation – would not threaten domestic elites, allowing the EU to reinforce its role of reliable 
partner. In the long term, it could bring to improve civil society’s conditions, since the government 
would not perceive the EU as a menace to its domestic stability and would rather accept a constructive 
dialogue in parallel with cooperation in more strategic sectors. Brussels would have the opportunity 
to pursue not only short term pragmatic interests, but also a long-term commitment towards 
democracy.  
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